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Abstract 
This article documents developments and debates in policy formation for Crown land in 
New Brunswick from the period 1997 to 2014. Particular focus is given to how the public 
was engaged in those policy deliberations. The Department of Natural Resources 
experimented with several public engagement exercises from 1997 to 2007. From 2005–
2007 the government sponsored, but then backed away from, a public opinion study that 
demonstrated the public’s preference for a conservation-first timber-second strategy for 
Crown land management. Since 2008, successive governments of both major parties have 
adopted a more closed and less consultative approach to natural resource policy 
development. 
Résumé 
Cet article décrit les développements et les débats liés à l’élaboration de politiques visant 
les terres de la Couronne du Nouveau-Brunswick, et ce, de 1997 à 2014. Une attention 
particulière est accordée à l’engagement du public à l’égard des délibérations relatives à 
ces politiques. Le ministère des Ressources naturelles a mis à l’essai plusieurs activités 
d’engagement du public de 1997 à 2007. De 2005 à 2007, le gouvernement a parrainé 
une étude d’opinion publique qui montrait la préférence du public pour une stratégie 
privilégiant la conservation plutôt que l’exploitation quant à la gestion des terres de la 
Couronne. Or, par la suite, il a pris ses distances par rapport à cela. Depuis 2008, les 
gouvernements successifs des deux grands partis ont adopté une démarche plus fermée et 
moins consultative quant à l’élaboration de politiques sur les ressources naturelles. 
Introduction 
This article covers seventeen years of recent New Brunswick history (1997–2014) and 
documents the sporadic attempts by the government to engage the public in forest policy and planning 
decisions. While some important data on forest values and citizen’s policy preferences has been 
gathered over that period of time, the government has had difficulty instituting any innovative policy 
experiments or reforms based on the input they have received from citizens and non-industrial 
stakeholders. As well, there appears to have been a historical opportunity between 2004 and 2007 when 
the government understood the importance of and believed in providing more and better opportunities 
for public engagement. Since 2008, however, governments led by both main political parties in the 
province have had little appetite for sponsoring additional public engagement regarding Crown land 
management. Recent changes in Crown land management have been tightly controlled by the 
government and closely choreographed with the forest industry. This article reviews several 
government-sponsored public-engagement initiatives, ranging from public hearings to solicitations of 
http://w3.stu.ca/stu/sites/jnbs 41 
REVUE D’ÉTUDES SUR LE NOUVEAU‐BRUNSWICK Issue 5 (2014) 
online submissions. Particular focus is given to a province-wide public opinion survey and the political 
fallout that occurred after its release. The overall intent is to consider the consistency of the messages 
that come from New Brunswick citizens regarding their priorities for Crown lands and the extent to 
which successive provincial governments have accepted or ignored these messages. 
I wish to comment on my unique perspective on this topic. I have been a vigilant observer 
throughout my sixteen-year residence in New Brunswick, but I have also been an occasional, albeit 
minor, player in this policy discussion. I have co-authored reports that have been co-sponsored by the 
provincial government relevant to the topics at hand (Nadeau et al. 2012, Nadeau et al. 2007). I have 
made written and oral presentations to the Legislative Select Committee on Wood Supply, and I have 
testified to the Senate Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in Ottawa (Senate Standing 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry 2011). I have contributed written comments to the Department 
of Natural Resources, submitted proposals for tenure pilot projects for consideration, and been a periodic 
commentator on forestry issues on radio and television. My professional expertise and concern 
throughout the past sixteen years has been to encourage more and better public engagement in natural 
resource planning and management and to champion democratic process in the disposition of Crown 
resources in land and forests. Others may characterize my work as “having an agenda,” but in this line of 
scholarship I am merely concerned with promoting procedural and participatory democracy in the forest 
sector in New Brunswick, and to have resource allocation and management decisions made in the light 
of day for the expressed interests of the owners of Crown forests, the citizens of New Brunswick. 
Forestry is a practice that is informed by science, but ultimately it is about values. Conveying 
this message to forestry students has been a core part of my professional life since joining the Faculty of 
Forestry and Environmental Management at the University of New Brunswick in 2000. Forest planning 
and policy, especially in a public lands context, is a matter of deciding how much and which types of 
forests are allocated to which stakeholders and for what uses. The title of Marion Clawson’s (1975) 
seminal book says it all: Forests for Whom and for What? The answers to those questions are values 
questions, and they are inescapably political. The answers to those questions will produce winners and 
losers as there is a wide spectrum of competing interests for the resources, opportunities, and services 
inherent in the public forest. While the forest may seem vast, it is finite and it is impossible to give 
everyone everything they want all of the time. Therefore, policy decisions, especially about the 
allocation of land for different uses, results in benefits to some (financial and otherwise) and costs or 
losses to others. 
Ultimately this article is more about democratic theory than it is about forest science. The forest 
management system in New Brunswick is a complex web of institutions, policies, resources, and social 
groups; and of course it encompasses the changing ecological conditions of the resource itself. 
Theoretically, the citizens of New Brunswick are the owners of Crown land in the province. The 
government is the steward, or in essence the manager that the public hires to carry out its wishes. The 
way the forestry debate unfolds is important as it is generally framed as a debate over science and not a 
debate over values; information generated from the biological or ecological sciences is generally given 
precedence over social science information, or information derived from direct engagement with citizens 
or stakeholders. Framing the debate as a technical problem makes an implicit assumption that if we get 
the science right, we can achieve a societal consensus and achieve an outcome beneficial to everyone. 
However, if we accept that forestry issues are values problems, then this has serious implications for 
Crown land policy. Rather than focusing heavily on the biophysical sciences, a values frame for the 
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forestry problem suggests that we need to spend more time identifying the competing values, examining 
the degree to which they conflict, and then managing and fairly adjudicating such conflicts. 
The Forest System in New Brunswick 
Forest land tenure in New Brunswick is unique in Canada. New Brunswick has a balance and 
distribution of private and public forest land that does not compare to any other province. Newfoundland 
and Labrador, as well as all the provinces from Quebec to the west coast are dominated by Crown land. 
All of these jurisdictions have more than 88% of their forests in public hands. Conversely, Nova Scotia 
and Prince Edward Island are dominated by private land ownership. New Brunswick falls in the middle, 
with 51% of land publicly held by citizens as Crown land, and 49% in private hands (Luckert, Haley, 
and Hoberg 2001). Of the half of the land base in private hands, the majority (31% of the total provincial 
land base) is held by roughly 42,000 private owners, while 19% of the total land base is in a category 
known as “industrial freehold” (Floyd, Ritchie, and Rotherham 2012). This land is owned by the forest 
industry. For forestry purposes, industrial freehold is subject to similar rules as Crown land, but owners 
of freehold have some privileges of private woodlots (rights of transferability, exclusivity, and the right 
to earn profit from resources on the land). 
The private land that is owned in small holdings in the province is concentrated along the north, 
east, and south coastlines, and along the major river systems (St. John and Miramichi). The 
administration of the public forest is overseen by the New Brunswick Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR). Since 1982, much of the direct management responsibility for that land has been in the hands of 
large industrial licence holders. At the advent of the Crown Lands and Forests Act (CLFA), the Crown 
land base was divided into ten licence areas and notionally allocated to eight firms that owned large 
processing facilities. Smaller sawmills were deemed “sub-licensees” and also had access to Crown 
timber to feed their mills, but the overall management of the land was done by the licensees, with 
oversight and monitoring by DNR (Baskerville 1995). 
According to the stipulations of the CLFA, licensees must create an industrial plan for five-year 
periods. Estimations of available wood supply go into these plans, as well as maps that project the forest 
blocks that will be harvested. These plans are reviewed and serve as a negotiation point between DNR 
and industry. In the early years of the CLFA, there was not much public consultation in this process. 
However, in the ten years following the CLFA, there was a policy known as primary source of supply. 
The government wished to avoid the perception that industry competing with private woodlot owners 
using cheap wood from Crown land. Therefore, primary source of supply was established whereby each 
spring, industry representatives went into negotiations with the organizations representing the private 
woodlot sector. The government required that industry contract a certain volume of wood at a certain 
price that was negotiated each year. Only after this annual volume and price negotiation was concluded 
would companies be given permission to harvest Crown timber resources. In 1993, without a formal 
change to the CLFA, the government reinterpreted primary source of supply to mean something 
different. Industry still purchased private wood, but they were no longer required to reach a contract to 
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Crown Land Policy and Public Engagement, 1997–2014 
The 1990s represented an extremely active era in public engagement in the forest sector in 
Canada. National and provincial governments were acknowledging the importance of social aspects of 
forestry. Part of this recognition included calls for more and better opportunities for the public to be 
involved with or consulted on forest policy and management at multiple scales. In Ontario, the Lands for 
Life process occurred in the late 1990s, which substantially increased the area of Crown forest that was 
protected (Cartwright 2003). In British Columbia, several consultative processes occurred during the 
1990s (Mascarenhas and Skarce 2004). National-level criteria and indicators for sustainable forest 
management were defined and indicators regarding public engagement were a part of that process. As 
well, forest certification arose during the 1990s and it also had requirements for public engagement. In 
short, there was great demand for public engagement and considerable innovation in forestry in the mid- 
to late-1990s across Canada (Duinker 1998; Chambers and Beckley 2003). 
The following section describes three phases of Crown land policy history in New Brunswick 
and the nature and extent to which public engagement occurred during each period. The first phase 
entails the protected natural areas (PNAs) process and the Legislative Select Committee on Wood 
Supply (1997–2004). The PNA process is mentioned only briefly, but this process is important in the 
story, in part, because the anticipated allocation of Crown land for permanent protection prompted 
concerns from industry and factored in to their demand for a guaranteed timber supply. The debate and 
discussion over industry’s desire for this defined timber objective is another important element of the 
first policy phase. The second phase comprised a number of commissioned studies and the formulation 
of strategies resulting from recommendations from the report of a bipartisan legislative committee 
(2004–08). This period culminated in the forest plan announced by the Liberal government of Shawn 
Graham in early 2009. The third phase (2009–14) documents the subsequent abandonment of many of 
the consultative practices that were established for forest policy and planning during phase two. 
Governments led by both political parties have significantly changed their practices regarding public 
engagement after briefly experimenting with a range of public engagement tools in the mid-2000s. 
Protected Natural Areas 
In 1997 the province undertook a province-wide exercise to identify and protect additional lands 
for protected natural areas. As a new resident of New Brunswick, employed by the Canadian Forest 
Service, I was just learning the political landscape and the particulars of the forestry issues in the 
province. I was perplexed by the seemingly contradictory positions of the forest industry and 
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). The ENGOs claimed that less than 3% of the 
land area of New Brunswick was protected. Environmental advocates were hoping to bring the area of 
Crown land under protected status to something closer to the 12% suggested by the Bruntland 
commission on sustainability (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). Industry, 
on the other hand, claimed that over 30% of New Brunswick’s Crown forest was already protected. The 
discrepancy was due to the fact that there were several land categories under different degrees of 
protection. Protected natural areas were conceived as places where no industrial activity would be 
allowed: no industrial forestry, no mining, no prospecting. In 1998, the percentage area with this status 
was less than 3%. Industry, on the other hand, was referring to more than 30% of the Crown land base 
that was in what is broadly called the conservation forest. This is land in various categories where 
harvesting is restricted, such as deer wintering areas, watercourse buffers of varying widths, and mature 
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coniferous forest habitat. Industry had partial access to some of this land for fibre. For example, a certain 
percentage of the volume of timber could be harvested from watercourse buffers, but industry claimed 
that the higher operating costs of selection harvest over clear-cutting, made operations in buffer zones 
too expensive. 
The modern era of formal public engagement in Crown forest policy and management began 
with this PNA process. Department of Natural Resources staff was not trained in the tools of public 
engagement but they knew they needed someone to coordinate a public engagement strategy as part of 
their effort to identify new Crown land for permanent protection. The Liberal government of Camille 
Theriault hired a Université de Moncton scientist, Louis Lapierre, to oversee the creation of a PNA plan 
and the public engagement process that would be part of the process of identifying candidate sites. Dr. 
Lapierre had access to a team of DNR staff and other supporting scientists. Ultimately they created 
criteria for candidate parcels of land for selection into the network of protected areas. Following the 
identification of candidate sites, Dr. Lapierre and his team held well-attended and widely available 
public meetings on the proposed protected areas. The process was not always smooth and there was 
some confusion about whether the plan to protect areas was limited to Crown land, but in the end New 
Brunswickers were given considerable opportunity to provide input into the process of site selection. 
Some of the meetings, run by Dr. Lapierre but sponsored by the provincial government, were attended 
by hundreds of people. In New Brunswick, the PNA process represented first steps in engaging the 
public in identifying priorities for Crown land management. 
Jaakko Pöyry Report and the Legislative Select Committee on Wood Supply 
In 2001, a letter addressed to Jeannot Volpe, minister of natural resources in Bernard Lord’s 
Conservative government, was leaked to the media. The letter, from the New Brunswick Forest Products 
Association (NBFPA), outlined a number of concerns. At the time, the forest industry in New 
Brunswick was importing as much as 10% of its fibre from out of province and they were worried about 
the stability of that supply. Industry also expressed concern with potential reductions in the supply of 
wood fibre from private woodlots, which traditionally contributed around 25% to New Brunswick’s 
industrial fibre supply. Most importantly, however, the letter from the NBFPA expressed concerns over 
reductions and potential reductions of fibre from Crown land. They saw threats from the following 
sources: (1) incremental increases (since 1982) in the conservation forest (mature habitat requirements, 
old forest requirements, and watercourse buffers), (2) commitments to First Nations for a share of the 
Crown land timber harvest, and (3) the ongoing PNA process, which was slated to take an additional 2% 
of the Crown land base permanently out of production. 
The letter from the industry organization generated considerable debate and discussion. The 
ENGO community became mobilized around the issue of Crown land being a public trust. They 
demanded that a more inclusive public engagement process be undertaken. Not long after the letter was 
leaked, the NBFPA announced that they had commissioned a report from the Finnish forestry consulting 
firm, Jaakko Pöyry, to analyze the province’s forest management system and its outcomes, and 
benchmark these against three other jurisdictions: Maine, Ontario, and Finland. While this was an 
industry initiative, Bernard Lord’s Conservative government asked to be a co-sponsor so that they could 
make the results of the report public (Jaakko Pöyry 2002). 
http://w3.stu.ca/stu/sites/jnbs 45 
REVUE D’ÉTUDES SUR LE NOUVEAU‐BRUNSWICK Issue 5 (2014) 
The Jaakko Pöyry (JP) Report was released in November of 2002 and the debate over Crown 
land management intensified. The Finnish consultants made the six following recommendations: 
(1) A timber supply objective should be set for each license area that would be binding on 
the Government and on the licensee. Timber supply objectives should be set for the range 
of species harvested commercially from each license. This would include a feedback loop 
to evaluate timber supply implications of DNRE management changes. 
(2) The industry and DNRE should jointly fund and support research and development of 
science-based forest management practices applicable in New Brunswick. 
(3) The public should participate in reviewing the objectives of management for New 
Brunswick’s Crown lands to provide a mandate for the direction and magnitude of 
change in forest management. 
(4) The DNRE should reduce overlap in management and oversight of Crown lands. 
Ontario provides a model on how industry/government responsibilities have been 
streamlined. 
(5) Special management zones should be critically reviewed and where possible 
additional harvesting permitted. These areas should be managed using the best science to 
meet habitat and timber supply objectives. 
(6) Conservation values of private lands should be taken into account when evaluating 
the need for set asides and special management on public lands. This should include a 
process to establish a form of voluntary conservation designation on private industry 
lands (and woodlots). (Jaakko Pöyry 8) 
There was considerable speculation following the report’s release regarding collusion between 
government and industry. The technical and political aspect of the report that most caught the media and 
the public’s attention was the statement in the report that “It is possible to almost double the long-term 
softwood supply for industrial purposes while meeting the current non-timber objectives for Crown 
Land in New Brunswick” (10). 
Ultimately, the public discussion of the report died down in the spring of 2003. Premier Lord 
called a late spring election and was successful in obtaining a second majority government. However, 
the Lord Conservatives garnered only two seats more than the Liberals, compared to the resounding 44–
10–1 margin of victory the Tories enjoyed when they swept into power in 1999. There was very little 
discussion of forestry during the election campaign, but once the election was over the issue came to the 
fore once again. During the summer, Premier Lord established a committee to examine the Crown land 
issue. The Legislative Select Committee on Wood Supply (LSCWS) was charged with a dual mandate: 
to examine “opportunities and strategies arising from the JP report to increase available wood supply 
from NB Crown land” and to examine “opportunities and strategies for the future direction of Crown 
land management” (Legislative Select Committee on Wood Supply 2004). The LSCWS was an eleven-
member, multi-party committee with representation from the ruling Conservatives, the opposition 
Liberals, and the one sitting member of the New Democratic Party, Elizabeth Weir. The LSCWS sought 
information and input through public hearings and by soliciting expert and stakeholder input on the 
Crown land forest management issue. The LSCWS originally scheduled seven days of public hearings 
during which any citizen or stakeholder group could sign up to give a presentation. The demand was so 
great, however, that ultimately thirteen days of hearings were scheduled between mid-November and 
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late December of 2003. In total, more than two hundred individuals made presentations to the 
committee. Another 250 letters and written submissions were offered. 
In early 2004, the LSCWS continued to call for expert testimony and input. Enough attention had 
been given during the hearings to the concept of community forestry that I was invited to address the 
committee on this issue. I had written scholarly articles about community forests elsewhere in Canada 
and had been a co-applicant for pilot funding to conduct a community forestry policy experiment in 
2001 and so was asked to provide expert opinion on the subject. 
In January 2004, a DNR staff review of the JP Report was released. Recommendation 4 of the JP 
Report was viewed as a not-so-thinly-veiled attack on DNR staffing levels. The report cited redundancy 
in monitoring and oversight, and suggested that with forest certification, industry was capable of 
policing itself with the occasional oversight of third-party auditors. The DNR staff report did not zero in 
on this point alone, however. Internal workshops with DNR staff were carried out across the province 
with 175 participants and seventy written submissions. The report included thirty-one recommendations. 
Perhaps the most critical related to the idea of adaptive management, or maintaining flexibility and 
reflexivity in management systems so that changes could be made (tinkering) as a result of monitoring 
the results of previous management actions. As stated in the report, “It is imperative to maintain an 
adaptive and flexible management approach, which can accommodate changes in forest and social 
values. The NB forest management approach would be restricted if a binding, long-term timber 
objective was adopted” (iv). The DNR staff review also took issue with the softwood focus in the JP 
Report. The authors did not object to the principle of setting targets or objectives for timber supply, but 
they recommended these be set for all commercial species, not simply spruce, fir, and pine. 
The staff report also suggested that there be more meaningful consultation with the public. The 
staff report recommended that DNR draft a strategy and guidelines for engaging the public in the goal-
setting process for Crown land management. As well, the authors suggested that a provincial advisory 
group be set up to provide advice to the minister of natural resources on Crown land management. 
Additional recommendations of the DNR staff review of the JP Report included enhancing linkages 
between existing research initiatives and DNR field staff, forgoing the aspiration to double the wood 
supply until more research had been conducted, and exploring the potential of more value-added 
products. 
The Legislative Select Committee on Wood Supply continued to gather information throughout 
the winter of 2003–04. They continued to interview experts and solicit advice and examine the reams of 
public comments received in the fall of 2003. The report was originally scheduled to arrive in June, but 
due to delays with translation, it did not appear until September 2004. 
The LSCWS went to great lengths to portray its recommendations as “balanced’ (i). The 
committee was also clear that it understood what industry sought, but it was not willing to recommend 
guarantees for a fibre supply for industry: “The Committee well understands the industry’s desire for a 
secure wood supply future and the investment advantages this offers. It also understands the 
Government’s role as trustee of the public forest and its responsibility to maintain management 
flexibility to accommodate future shifts in public values” (i). The LSCWS also strongly affirmed the 
government’s rightful place as steward of Crown land. Both industry and ENGO reformers were 
lobbying for more control over Crown land and its resources. Many presenters at the public hearings 
suggested community forestry as an alternative model for management of public land. Industry, on the 
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other hand, wanted a freer hand to harvest timber and intensify its silviculture efforts, but it wanted 
guarantees if it was to make investments in those areas. While either of these reforms could have been 
undertaken in an experimental framework to test hypotheses that such reforms could boost the rural and 
forest economies of New Brunswick, the elected members that made up the LSCWS viewed such 
reforms as a threat to government’s authority over Crown land. 
The LSCWS made twenty-five recommendations in total, nine coming under the heading of 
governance and accountability. Public engagement proposals were made in that section. The committee 
stated one of its key principles as follows: “The Government has delegated responsibility to the 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to manage the natural resources of the Province in the best 
interest of the people. The fulfillment of this mandate of public trust and stewardship can only be 
accomplished with meaningful input from the citizens of the Province” (13). Overall, the LSCWS 
suggested that government needed to design a strategy for public participation, with a suggested target 
of 2007. The committee was impressed with the quality, passion, and breadth of presentations they heard 
in the public-hearing process and they recommended that a similar public participation process be 
undertaken every ten years. Had that recommendation been heeded, there would have been a timely 
round of public hearings in 2013. The committee echoed the DNR staff review’s suggestion of 
establishing a provincial advisory committee that would report to the minister of natural resources. They 
recommended that the roles of the licensee stakeholder advisory committees be clarified, and they 
recommended that DNR and the minister produce an annual state-of-the-forest report. 
With respect to forest management objectives, the committee recommended that quantifiable 
wood supply objectives be determined for all commercial species. This did not mean they would 
guarantee a supply to industry, but rather that analysis should be conducted on a regular basis so that 
DNR staff would know what species of wood was available and in what quantities. The committee 
recommended that the amount of clear-cutting be reduced. At the same time, they recommended that 
existing thinning and silviculture rules be altered in an attempt to reduce the impact of the anticipated 
short-term softwood shortfall. The committee also gave a nod to private woodlot owners by 
recommending that “primary source of supply” negotiations be supported. In order to increase 
transparency, the committee recommended that the Crown royalty rates for timber be subject to a third-
party review. The committee further recognized the link with future fibre supply and silviculture and 
recommended the government make longer-term commitments to silviculture investments (which 
previously had been announced only on a year-to-year basis). 
The LSCWS report stressed recommitment to government stewardship and extolled the efficacy 
of the Crown Lands and Forest Act. Reforms, it claimed, could and should occur within the context of 
the existing rule and tenure structure. While this was a balanced approach, experimentation with more 
intensive fibre production in some regions and with community forest tenures in other regions could also 
have been balanced, but more experimental. In effect, by recommending that government retain sole 
responsibility for the stewardship of Crown forests and in denying industry its desired timber objective, 
the LSCWS recommendations prolonged the conflict. Experimentation with different management and 
tenure models might have answered some questions about the desirability of reforms. Members of the 
committee claimed that they were seeking balance, and in large measure, they achieved that goal. 
However, they were also cautious. For example, the LSCWS report states clearly that community 
forestry should not be pursued: 
http://w3.stu.ca/stu/sites/jnbs 48 
JOURNAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK STUDIES Issue 5 (2014) 
The Committee does not recommend establishment of community forests on New 
Brunswick Crown land. Such a form of forest tenure was advocated by some at the 
hearings on the grounds that the current system allows too little public influence over 
management objectives, provides too few local employment opportunities, and stifles 
opportunity for innovative value-added and non-timber based economic enterprises. 
These three claims have merit and the Committee has attempted to address each in its 
recommendations. (iii) 
At the same time, the report did not consider a wholesale adoption of the Jaakko Pöyry 
recommendations: 
While the Committee does not claim to have all the answers to the difficult questions 
about managing New Brunswick’s public forest, after careful deliberation, it does not 
view the Jaakko Pöyry Report as a “go forward” document. The Committee appreciates 
the value of the Jaakko Pöyry Report in stimulating a broad and open discussion 
regarding the future of forest management on Crown land. However, it believes 
management of the public forest is best served by a public vision, put forward by 
Government as trustees of that forest. (ii) 
The creation of the LSCWS was an important event in New Brunswick forest history. It marked 
the first time in the modern management era that elected members of the legislature directly reached out 
to garner public and stakeholder comment on the job the government was doing with Crown land 
management and preferences for future directions for management of the 3.4 million hectares the 
government managed in public trust for the citizens of New Brunswick. Unfortunately, the release of the 
report, delayed as it was, landed right in the middle of a tempest in the forest sector. On 14 September 
2004, the Saint Anne Nackawic mill announced its closure, putting four hundred people out of work. 
The LSCWS report was released on 15 September. Two weeks later, the UPM Kymenne mill in 
Miramichi announced that it was closing the following January, putting another four hundred forestry 
workers on the street (CBC News 2004). The combination of these announcements gave the impression 
that New Brunswick’s forest sector was in a free fall. The rollout of the LSCWS report at the same time 
as an apparent crash in the New Brunswick forest sector put a huge amount of pressure on political 
leaders to come up with a strategy to support industry at all costs rather than to implement the wide-
ranging and balanced recommendations in the LSCWS report. While some promising initiatives did 
emerge from the committee’s recommendations, few were sustained in the long term as one forestry 
crisis merged into the next. 
Follow-up to LSCWS Accountability Commitments 
A number of positive initiatives emerged from the work of the LSCWS. One was a large-scale 
wood supply modelling exercise with broad stakeholder representation. Dr. Thom Erdle from the UNB 
Faculty of Forestry and Environmental Management was seconded by the provincial government to lead 
the study. The initiative was dubbed the Erdle Task Force, though its formal name was the New 
Brunswick Task Force on Forest Diversity and Wood Supply. Its objective was to develop a set of forest 
management alternatives for Crown land that allow a healthy wood supply for all commercial species 
while retaining the essential features of the Acadian forest. Dr. Erdle was very clear that the task force’s 
objectives were not to make recommendations but rather to conduct analyses, present some trade-offs, 
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demonstrate the likely consequences for forest diversity and wood supply of different potential paths, 
and identify tools that would need to be employed to achieve different outcomes (e.g., planting, 
thinning, or setting aside additional land for conservation or preservation). The task force was made up 
of two industry representatives, two ENGO representatives, one federal and one provincial government 
representative, a representative for private woodlot owners, and two academic experts on wood supply 
modelling. 
At the same time, the government began to correct the deficiencies identified in the LSCWS’s 
report regarding public engagement. To that end, in September 2005 the executive committee of the 
DNR invited me and Dr. Solange Nadeau from the Canadian Forest Service to give a presentation on 
options and tools for public engagement. The executive committee was open to a broad range of 
possibilities and we advocated a diverse approach. Given the diversity of stakeholders, the different 
degree of stakes in outcomes, and the geographic breadth of the province, among other factors, we 
suggested that they develop a public engagement program consisting of social science tools that 
employed multiple methods across a range of dimensions (large group/small group, 
quantitative/qualitative, anonymous/participatory). Our key message was that there was no one “silver 
bullet” tool for soliciting input from the public (Beckley, Parkins, and Sheppard 2006). While the 
leadership of DNR understood that point and agreed in principle, they decided to proceed with a 
province-wide random sample survey in order to gauge public sentiment and opinion regarding Crown 
land. A secondary objective was for DNR to obtain feedback on public satisfaction with the job it was 
doing regarding stewardship of Crown land. 
In early 2006 a research team was put together, including Dr. Nadeau, Dr. Stephen Wyatt of the 
Université de Moncton Edmundston campus, and Dr. Bonita MacFarlane of Natural Resources Canada. 
There was some interesting discussion between our home institutions’ lawyers and legal counsel for 
DNR about who would own the intellectual property (IP), but eventually a collaborative research 
agreement was reached in which we agreed to share the data and the IP. The researchers from three 
different institutions gave their time and the Department of Natural Resources provided the operating 
expenses required to do a large mail-out survey. 
Throughout 2006 the team worked closely with DNR staff to create a survey that covered a 
broad spectrum of topics, including DNR’s performance, respondents’ forest use, forest values, attitudes 
toward public policy, and attitudes toward forest management activities. As well, there were questions 
regarding trust of forest-sector institutional players, and one scenario question about future management 
of Crown land. After over a dozen rounds of survey drafts, translation into French, and printing, the 
survey was administered in March 2007. 
During the period of survey development, another provincial election was held. Bernard Lord’s 
Conservatives were ousted by the Liberals under the leadership of Shawn Graham. Initially there was 
concern that the Graham government might cancel the survey and the Erdle Task Force and take the 
forestry file in a very different direction; however, both project teams were given instructions to carry on 
with their work. In addition, Don Roberts, vice-chairman for CIBC World Markets, Inc., was retained to 
do an economic study to identify international product trends and to match those up with New 
Brunswick’s resource base. 
As the survey took form and was put in the field, some other public engagement and/or 
accountability activities took place. The Graham government did take up the LSCWC suggestion that 
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the Department of Natural Resources create an annual state-of-the-forest report (Department of Natural 
Resources 2008). Such a report was published in 2008, but the practice remained in place for only one 
year. (The department has continued to publish annual reports.) A provincial advisory council was 
established to provide input directly to the minister from science experts, and key stakeholders such as 
the NB Federation of Woodlot Owners, the NB Forest Products Association, and First Nations. This 
advisory council met three to four times per year from 2007–10 but became dormant under David 
Alward’s Conservative government (personal communication, Don Floyd, 2 April 2014). 
Results and Highlights from the Survey 
There were some unique aspects of the province-wide survey. We were careful in the design to 
provide regional balance and balance between Francophone and Anglophone respondents. We over-
sampled in rural regions based on the level of forest dependence to see if respondents from low, 
moderate, or high forest-dependent communities differed in their responses. In the past, it was 
commonly assumed that places such as Dalhousie, Miramichi, Doaktown, and Nackawic would be very 
supportive of industrial forest policies and Crown land management strategies that maximized access to 
Crown timber by industry. We constructed the survey sample so that we could test that hypothesis. 
Ultimately, there were four distinct segments: residents from urban areas (with forest dependence 0–
24%), and residents from low (0–24%), moderate (25–49%), and highly (50% and higher) forest-
dependent communities (Nadeau et al. 2007; MacFarlane et al. 2011). 
The survey consisted of approximately thirty questions, though many had several components. In 
all, it was sent to 2,502 respondents. We used the standard tailored design method, whereby a survey 
was sent, then a reminder postcard was sent to non-respondents a few weeks later; and a second survey 
was sent to non-respondents two weeks later. In the end, we received more than 1,500 usable responses 
for an unusually large 62% response rate. The response rate suggests that people were very engaged 
with this issue and wanted to make their opinions known. As well, we had very even distributions of 
response to the four geographical categories, and a proportional representation by language group 
(Nadeau et al. 2007). 
Overall, New Brunswickers expressed a very strong preference for environmental values with 
respect to Crown land. We asked respondents to rank what they felt was most important between air, 
water, and soil quality; wildlife habitat; timber and jobs; recreation; and non-timber forest products. 
Some 62% ranked air, water, and soil quality maintenance as number one or two in their list of 
priorities. Maintenance of wildlife habitat came in second, with 50% expressing a rank of one or two for 
that category. Jobs and timber was third, with 30% ranking it first or second; a full 21% ranked this as 
their lowest priority. We asked respondents their preferences regarding the seven priorities set out in 
DNR’s Vision Document (2005). Since these were the broad objectives and goals that the government 
sets out for Crown land, we expected support for all of them, but what was most of interest was the 
degree of support. Water quality and habitat protection were rated most important, with more than 90% 
saying these were very important or important. Protection from fire was also deemed to be “very 
important” by over 80% of respondents. “Ensure that wood supply for the forest industry remain at 
current levels” was deemed important or very important by over 70% of respondents, but it received the 
least support from among the seven choices (Nadeau et al. 2007). 
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There were additional responses to the survey that demonstrated the public is not in favour of 
accommodating industry’s fibre needs ahead of perceived conservation needs. A majority (58%) agreed 
or strongly agreed with the statement “The amount of timber cut in New Brunswick is too high.” As 
well, 57% agreed or strongly agreed that “The forest industry has too much control over forest 
management in New Brunswick.” Interestingly, counter to the hypothesis regarding greater rural support 
for industry, agreement with these statements was stronger in rural regions. Conversely, 57% of New 
Brunswickers disagreed or strongly disagreed that “The economic contributions of the forest industry 
outweigh the environmental impacts” and 56% disagreed or strongly disagreed that “New Brunswick 
has enough protected areas” (Nadeau et al. 2007). 
As previously mentioned, the Department of Natural Resources was interested in using the 
survey as an evaluation tool to find out what the public thought DNR was doing well and where it could 
improve. The department scored highest on managing deer habitat. As well, more respondents expressed 
satisfaction than dissatisfaction with DNR’s performance related to “promoting economic development 
through forest industries” and “supporting management of private woodlots.” However, the department 
did not fare as well in two important categories. Nearly 45% expressed dissatisfaction with DNR’s 
record on representing the public interest, compared to only 25% who expressed satisfaction in this 
regard. Even more dramatic, by more than a 2:1 margin (47% to 22%), respondents expressed 
dissatisfaction with DNR’s job involving the public in decision making (Nadeau et al. 2007). 
In anticipation of additional public engagement opportunities, we asked survey respondents to 
identify what types of public engagement tools they would be likely to participate in going forward. 
Interestingly, the two engagement tools that respondents suggested they were least likely to use were 
licensee advisory committees and making presentations at public hearings. Advisory committees require 
a large investment of time. Presentations in a public-hearing format require participants to overcome the 
fear many have of public speaking, so both of these tools, while potentially effective, have high costs to 
participants in time or trauma. More popular choices for future public engagement were “respond to 
requests for information,” “use toll-free numbers,” “answer future surveys similar to this one.” The most 
popular response was “vote in a province-wide referendum” (Nadeau et al. 2007). The last two 
governments of both Liberal and Conservative persuasion have moved toward giving opportunities to 
“respond to requests for information,” but as discussed below, they have done so in a manner that lacks 
transparency. 
We asked respondents to list the organization or group that best reflected their own values when 
it came to forest management issues on Crown land. The two government agencies on the list set scored 
the highest (respondents were allowed to circle up to three from a list); 50% of respondents chose New 
Brunswick DNR and 42% named New Brunswick Department of Environment, which also has some 
responsibilities with respect to the oversight of environmental rules on Crown land. There were three 
organizations, tightly clustered with around the 30% range among respondents: the Conservation 
Council of New Brunswick (the highest profile and politically most active ENGO), the more generic 
“watershed management groups,” and “environmental organizations.” Forest companies garnered only 
about half the support of these three response entities, coming in just under 15%. Interestingly, members 
of the provincial legislature and the media came last, with only 2.5% and 2.3%, respectively, responding 
that these organizations best reflected their values. 
Finally, we asked a question that took considerable negotiation with our DNR partners to even 
include in the survey. We were curious about a scenario wherein one of the existing industrial forest 
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licence holders wanted to close a mill, thereby “freeing up” Crown land that could be allocated to 
another enterprise or institution. In that event, we were curious as to which institution(s) respondents 
would prefer to see as a land manager (respondents were able to check all that applied from a list). Only 
2% checked the box “I think things are working fine the way they are.” Responses to this were strong 
and clear, and matched well the priorities respondents had listed before for management priorities to go 
to environmental values first, industry needs after. The highest response category was environmental 
organizations, which received endorsement by 56% of respondents. Second and third on their list were 
local communities (46%) and woodlot owners (38%). An agency managed by the provincial government 
received a 37% favourable response. The category “existing forest companies that currently have access 
to Crown wood” received endorsement by 21% of respondents (Nadeau et al. 2007). 
Survey Aftermath 
In October 2007, a draft of the survey report was delivered to DNR officials. The principal 
authors of the report met with DNR senior staff and went through the results. The government 
representatives were not surprised or concerned with any particular components of the survey. With 
respect to their own performance, the DNR executive felt that the survey confirmed their own suspicions 
about where they were perceived to do well (protection issues) and where they lacked support (public 
engagement). They also were not surprised with the public’s strong expression of environmental values 
and support for environmental organizations. In short, the senior leadership seemed satisfied with the 
results and with the professional quality of the exercise; they realized that the results might have 
implications for how they would conduct their business in the future. It should be noted that in the early 
days of the instrument design, one member of the executive committee essentially said, “Why are we 
doing this [the survey], the Erdle Task Force will tell us what direction to take.” In fact, the task force’s 
terms of reference explicitly stated that they would provide options but that they would not make 
recommendations. Like our own survey, the task force’s job was a technical one, not a political one. 
However, the opportunity would exist, if decision-makers so desired, to match up public priorities and 
preferences from the survey with options outlined in the Erdle Task Force. 
Well after the Erdle Task Force began its work and while the survey was being implemented in 
the field, the Graham Liberals contracted Don Roberts, vice-chairman of CIBC World Markets, Inc., to 
do a study on the economic opportunities afforded by New Brunswick’s forest resource. Roberts 
partnered with Peter Woodbridge of Woodbridge Associates and produced a report that described where 
new economic and export opportunities might lie for the forest sector and which of these offered long-
term prospects for success (Roberts and Woodbridge 2008). The intent was to round out the work on 
social preference and public opinion (i.e., the survey), and ecological possibilities and constraints (i.e., 
the Erdle Task Force’s work) with information regarding the economic feasibility of various options. 
The release of the survey report was delayed, first due to an inadequate translation into French, 
then to delays with the premier’s state-of-the-province address. Finally the report was released at the end 
of February 2008. We had previously arranged with DNR officials to do a seven-city tour to present 
results to interested citizens. The minister of natural resources, Donald Arsenault, however, requested 
that we add his hometown, Dalhousie, and also St. Stephen, so the tour would consist of nine dates. The 
format was to present the survey results and respond to questions. The tour was not intended to be a 
formal government consultation process. However, an hour before the first presentation, which was held 
in Fredericton, the DNR contact for the research team informed us that evening’s event would go 
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forward but that the remainder of the tour had been cancelled. We were also told that the leadership of 
DNR hoped that we would “respect that decision.” The latter reference was recognition that through our 
collaborative research agreement, the report’s authors co-owned the data with the government, and 
therefore we were free to disseminate it as we saw fit. This order came down within an hour or two of 
the end of a cabinet meeting. The superiors of two of the principal authors residing in New Brunswick 
were phoned—the dean of the Faculty of Forestry at UNB and the director general of the Atlantic 
Forestry Centre of the Canadian Forest Service. They were asked to encourage us to refrain from 
disseminating the results of the survey. 
The media reaction to the cancellation of the tour was strong and swift. Former minister of 
natural resources, Jeannot Volpé, attacked Minister Arsenault in the legislature for cancelling the tour: 
I just can’t believe it. New Brunswickers want to be part of the process. They want to be 
able to say something about how we manage our forests. The only way that I can see why 
[the sessions] were cancelled is because the industry doesn’t like what was in the report. 
It’s like [the Liberals] are a bunch of puppets out there and the industry is controlling 
what they say and when they say it. (O’Toole 2012: A2) 
The Telegraph Journal reported further that 
Arseneault stood by his move to kill the sessions, saying the survey information is easily 
accessible online to all interested parties. He pointed to a coming report from Thom 
Erdle, the leader of the government’s forestry task force, as the key to moving forward 
and said that’s what they want to focus on now. “With the Erdle report, which is coming 
out really soon, we will make the decisions,” Arseneault said. (O’Toole 2012: A2) 
To the survey team, this seemed an unusual turn of events. The very minister who had reviewed 
the results of our survey and requested us to increase the number of public information sessions 
suddenly cancelled the entire tour. Our feeling was that using the survey results in tandem with the Erdle 
Task Force results and Don Robert’s recommendations could have resulted in a policy direction that was 
socially acceptable, ecologically achievable, and economically feasible. The tour cancellation and the 
calls to our superiors made us relatively certain that the attempt to shelve the survey was a cabinet-level 
decision, not one taken exclusively by DNR. 
For a week the survey team did nothing while public outrage over the cancellation of the tour 
percolated. One of the clearest results in our findings was that the public wanted more and better 
opportunities to provide input on forest management on Crown land. The Graham government was 
clearly ignoring this key finding. After a week, the survey team decided to conduct our own shortened 
tour. We rented community halls, brought cider and cookies that we purchased, and told people what the 
survey revealed about public opinion regarding Crown land management. The first presentation in 
Miramichi was a bit contentious because some in the audience mistakenly took us for government 
employees. They were angry about the implosion of the forest industry in their region and took our 
presentation as an opportunity to vent their feelings. In subsequent meetings, we made it very clear from 
the outset that the government did not want us to be there, but as the survey was conducted with public 
money, we felt a professional obligation to disseminate the results. Introducing our presentations that 
way resulted in a much warmer reception. 
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The cancellation of the government-sponsored tour served only to heighten public interest and 
increase the concern that Liberal government was trying to bury or at least downplay the results. There 
was a political cartoon that depicted the government cutting off its own legs with a chainsaw. By 
attempting to silence the survey results, the Liberal government succeeded in making the public much 
more interested in its contents. Six years later, the survey is still mentioned frequently in policy 
discussions. 
Throughout the summer, however, the survey team was still in discussions with our primary 
contact at DNR about the possible public engagement activities that might ensue following the release of 
the Erdle and Roberts Reports. We talked about the possibility of additional public engagement tools 
that we had briefed the DNR executive about two years earlier. In August, the Erdle Task Force Report 
and the Roberts Report were issued at a joint press conference attended by Dr. Erdle, Mr. Roberts, 
Minister of Natural Resources Donald Arsenault, and Minister of Finance Greg Byrne. With full 
government sponsorship, Dr. Erdle and Mr. Roberts did conduct a five-community dissemination tour 
with a similar format to the one we had planned—a report summary presentation followed by questions 
for the authors. 
There was a moment in the fall of 2008 when the Liberal government had an opportunity to do 
something unique. Results from the public opinion survey described the general priorities and 
preferences of the public for Crown land management. The Erdle Task Force Report described eight 
scenarios that involved varying intensities of management for fibre versus management strategies more 
in line with conservation objectives. Every scenario provided trade-offs, but in aggregate, the report 
focused on the tools that would be required to achieve one of eight visions for the future forest of New 
Brunswick. Finally, the Roberts and Woodbridge Report (2008) outlined what was economically 
feasible and practical given New Brunswick forest resources and trends and directions in global markets. 
All three dimensions of what are generally considered the three pillars of sustainability were present: 
what was economically feasible, what was ecologically possible, and what was socially acceptable. The 
three reports made for the perfect springboard for a broad and deep provincial dialogue about the way 
forward. During the 2006 election campaign, the Liberal opposition emphasized their commitment to 
listening to the people and to consulting them on major issues. Around the time of the information tour 
for the Erdle and Roberts Reports (and it was merely information, not consultation), the government 
announced a comment period for citizens to provide input. DNR received over six hundred e-mails and 
additional input from face-to-face meetings and hardcopy letters (DNR 2009a); however, no summary of 
those comments was ever published or presented and the opportunity passed without further public 
engagement on the issue. 
New Brunswick Forest Policy and Public Engagement since 2008 
At the end of January 2009, Premier Graham announced his government’s plan. The document 
was titled “Be Sustainable in This Place: A Balanced Management Approach to New Brunswick’s 
Crown Forest.” The plan did not involve major alterations to the annual allowable harvest but did shift 
priorities going forward. The area of conservation forest was scheduled to decrease from 30% to 23–
25%. The area designated protected natural areas was scheduled to increase from 4% to 6–8%. The 
minimum old forest area stayed the same at 25%, but the maximum area allowed for plantations 
increased from 25% to 28%. Industry representatives at the announcement seemed pleased and said that 
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the strategy represented a balanced approach. Conservation and ENGO leaders were upset and many 
said that minimum thresholds for habitat and conservation values had been crossed (DNR 2009). 
In direct contrast to the approach favoured by a majority of respondents to the public opinion 
survey released roughly a year earlier, the plan appeared to put industry’s needs for fibre above the 
maintenance of conservation values. The plan did not adopt wholesale any of the eight options presented 
in the Erdle Report. Rather, it created an “option nine” that was an amalgam of the strategies and trade-
offs outlined in that report. However, it did adopt the language and indicators of the Erdle Report and 
used the report to justify its new plan as “science-based.” The press release also referenced the Roberts 
and Woodbridge Report. The scientific and economic aspects of the plan were highlighted, but no 
mention was made of the public opinion survey (DNR 2009a). 
On page two of that document, in a section titled “Government Process to Develop Response,” it 
is stated, “In mid-September 2008, public hearings were held in five cities across the province” 
(Department of Natural Resources 2009). This is disingenuous at best and purposefully deceptive at 
worst. The five sessions in Nackawic, Campbellton, Dalhousie, Sussex, and Miramichi were information 
sessions only in which Dr. Erdle and Mr. Roberts presented their respective reports and responded to 
audience questions. There were no elected officials or DNR employees explicitly representing the 
government or formal record of the public comments. The report authors did not put forward any 
specific policy recommendations, there were no formal interveners, and participants did not have to sign 
up for a presentation as is normally the case in a formal public hearing. The government did receive six 
hundred responses to their call for input, but there was never a public process to discuss alternatives or 
possible outcomes to the “option nine” identified by Graham’s government. In reality, nothing close to a 
public engagement process occurred. DNR representatives assembled feedback individually and then 
made what they claimed was a “balanced decision” behind closed doors, without any public or 
bipartisan scrutiny of the results of the public feedback. 
During the week of the announcement there was considerable media attention to the issue as is 
common when new Crown land policies are brought forward. Despite the lack of alignment between the 
public preferences expressed in the survey and the Liberal government’s plan, there was little sustained 
public outcry. The ENGOs redoubled their efforts, but a more widespread movement against the forest 
policy did not emerge. However, by fall, Shawn Graham’s plan to sell NB Power to Hydro Quebec was 
leaked and for the next six months the premier was preoccupied with damage control on that issue. This 
was a different file, but one in which his government also seemed out of step with public opinion, and 
one for which virtually no public consultation or engagement preceded a major public policy 
announcement related to natural resources. One year after Graham’s attempt to sell NB Power began, 
the Liberals were voted out of office. Shawn Graham retained his seat but the Conservatives gained a 
strong majority. The demise of Graham’s government was largely viewed as result of the non-
consultative nature of his government on the NB Power file but the NB Power issue was only the 
continuation of a trend of non-consultation that extended to forestry and also a key decision on French 
immersion. 
David Alward’s Conservatives swept into power, just like Graham’s Liberals had four years 
earlier, with the promise that they would listen to the people and govern with a much more open and 
consultative style. Of course, this was exactly the campaign promise that helped Graham come to power 
in 2006. On the forestry file, Premier Alward opened with a summit of invited stakeholders in 
November 2010, just two months after coming into power. Many in the profession thought that the 
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summit was going to entail a broad dialogue about charting a path forward for Crown land management. 
Instead, it was exclusively about what government could do to help the ailing forest industry. Don 
Roberts from CIBC was the keynote speaker, and he emphasized again how New Brunswick had the 
ingredients to be successful in international forest product markets, but in order to achieve that success, 
we would need to be nimble and that various stakeholders that historically had been at odds (particularly 
industry and private woodlot owners) would need to cooperate and collaborate better than we had in the 
past (DNR 2010). Following the summit, the Alward government decided to sponsor reports to be 
undertaken by two task forces: one on Crown land management and one on private woodlot 
management. 
The Crown Lands Task Force was headed by UNB business professor and former finance 
minister Norm Betts, and included Andrea Fuenekes and Roger Clinch. The Private Land Task Force 
was led by UNB Forestry and Environmental Management Dean Don Floyd, and included Tony 
Rotherham and Rob Ritchie. While members of both task forces did speak to dozens of key forest-sector 
informants in developing their reports, there was no formal public engagement dimension in the creation 
of the reports or following their release. Dr. Floyd organized a one-day symposium for contributors to 
the reports to share their results and it was attended by a veritable “who’s who” in forestry in New 
Brunswick. Following the trend set by the Liberals, however, Minister Northrup announced each report, 
said that they were available to view online, and invited citizens to e-mail comments. 
A major mandate for the Crown Lands Task Force was to make recommendations on the 
establishment of a timber objective (Crown Lands Task Force 2011). In fact, the idea of a timber 
objective was a major part of the agenda at the forestry summit of 2010, and the same idea was at the 
heart of the Jaakko Pöyry Report. Throughout the entire ten-year period from 2002 to 2012, industry’s 
quest for a “timber objective” had an ambiguous element to it. It was never really articulated in 2002 or 
at the 2010 forestry summit if industry was merely seeking a government promise or a stronger 
commitment in the form of guaranteed contracts. Normal practice is for the government set targets for 
the annual allowable cut (AAC). Indeed if the licence holders did not harvest to within 5% of their AAC, 
they risked being penalized. In that sense, the AAC number was a commitment more than a target. But 
industry seemed to want more—a guarantee of some sort that AAC numbers would remain stable for the 
long term, not simply in five-year increments. As well, the talk of a timber objective seemed to imply 
committing to a given fibre supply first, and doing conservation on the land that remained after timber 
targets were met, but that point was never clarified in the first decade of the debate. 
In March 2012 Minister Bruce Northrup announced the Alward government’s new forest plan. 
To the relief of the ENGO community, he committed to keeping 28% of the Crown forest in some form 
of conservation status (stream buffer, deer wintering areas, or any of the twenty forest ecological 
communities that require protection to maintain thresholds of intact habitat). While this was a decrease 
from the 30% of the land base in the conservation forest prior to 2009, it represented an increase over 
the 23–25% conservation forest that Liberal Premier Graham had announced in 2009. Assistant Deputy 
Minister Paul Orser gave the bulk of the presentation. He announced that AAC levels would remain the 
same for softwood. Again, there was no guarantee of a timber objective given, but a target that 
government committed to and that industry would need to meet. Orser reported good news for industry 
in that the plantations and thinned stands from the 1980s and 1990s were growing faster than anticipated 
and that more wood would very likely be available in the medium-term future (ten to fifteen years 
hence). The hardwood AAC was reduced slightly, from 1.77 million m3 to 1.41 million m3, but the 
minister explained “it would be in no one’s interest to harvest hardwood species at a level that would 
http://w3.stu.ca/stu/sites/jnbs 57 
REVUE D’ÉTUDES SUR LE NOUVEAU‐BRUNSWICK Issue 5 (2014) 
require an even larger AAC reduction in the future” (CBC 2012). The announcement also included a 
pledge to increase the amount of Crown land in protected natural areas from 4% to 8%. Despite the 
pledge from the Liberal government for exactly the same amounts in 2009, no new areas had yet been 
defined. Work was ongoing to define candidate sites, but the slowness of the process allowed Minister 
Northrup to pledge this change a second time. 
The ENGO and woodlot representatives in attendance at the announcement were not thrilled, but 
those I spoke with felt it was a plan that they could live with. Industry representatives, on the other hand, 
appeared visibly upset. The government stated that AAC levels were stable and that there would be 
growth opportunity in the future; they extended the planning period (and hence a commitment to fibre 
allocations) from five to ten years. It appeared, however, that industry representatives expected a 
commitment to a guaranteed wood supply and they did not get it. 
In the subsequent two years there has been little in the news regarding forestry and again no 
government-sponsored public engagement save for input requested at the new slate of candidate PNAs. 
During that time the woodlot owner associations have become locked in a legal battle with J.D. Irving, 
Ltd., over a ruling on the implications of selling stumpage (cutting rights) for property rights (“The 
Thing Itself” 2014). In the fall of 2013 there was a cabinet shuffle. Minister Northrup was moved out of 
natural resources, as was the deputy minister of that department. Assistant Deputy Minister Paul Orser, 
the senior DNR official with a forestry background, left for a private-sector opportunity. The new 
minister (Paul Robichaud) and deputy minister (Bill Levesque) were brought in from economic 
development. Through the winter of 2013-14, there was talk that industry was lobbying government 
hard once again for a guaranteed fibre supply. Premier Alward announced in his state-of-the-province 
address in January 2014 that a new forest strategy would be announced in the coming days. The days 
stretched to weeks. During those weeks, there was considerable speculation the forest industry would get 
its way and that the woodlot owners and conservation community would be shut out. One woodlot 
owner organization leader who wished to remain anonymous informed me that DNR was no longer even 
returning his calls. People were concerned about the arrival of a new plan given the anecdotal evidence 
that industry had been lobbying relentlessly and there was very little interaction between the DNR 
minister and other stakeholder groups on future policy directions. When confronted outside the 
legislature by street blogger Charles Leblanc about whether he would give the public the opportunity to 
comment on the plan, the premier said twice that “the public has already been consulted” (Leblanc 
2014). 
On 12 March 2014, the Alward government announced its new forest strategy. By most 
accounts, it was a complete victory for the forest industry. The strategy promised a 20% increase in the 
softwood AAC (660,000 m3) from Crown land. In a reversal of what Minister Northrup said two years 
before, Minister Robichaud announced the hardwood AAC would remain at the 1.8 million m3 level, 
but that this was suddenly sustainable. In order to achieve that volume of harvest, the conservation forest 
was slated to be reduced by 20% (back to 23% of the entire Crown forest, as had been announced before 
by the Graham Liberals). While the minister and the premier claimed that this was a balanced approach, 
the DNR launched an aggressive campaign with the slogan, “Putting Our Resources to Work,” to sell the 
new policy (DNR 2014). There were full-page colour advertisements in the newspapers, and in the three 
subsequent days following the announcement a string of industry infrastructure investments were 
announced around the province. This only enhanced the perception that this was a highly choreographed 
collaboration between the forest industry and the government. The minister alleged that five hundred 
permanent jobs would be created, though upon closer inspection only two hundred were anticipated to 
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be “direct jobs” and three hundred were expected to be “indirect jobs.” New investments in mills would 
result in short-term benefits of twelve hundred construction jobs. If these projections prove accurate, the 
province will have gained a 1.5% increase in forest-sector employment in exchange for a 20% increase 
in wood supply and a 20% reduction in the conservation forest. Incidentally, the government also 
announced, for the third time, that protected natural areas were being increased from 4% of the Crown 
land base to 8%. This represented the second time the Alward government took credit for this 
commitment even though it was originally announced by the Liberals back in 2009. The continued re-
announcement of this commitment was an effort to assuage environmental interests, but as UNB wildlife 
professor Graham Forbes explained on CBC radio, “If I gave my child four Christmas presents last year, 
and this year I give her four more but I re-wrap the ones I gave her last year, it does not really mean that 
I gave her eight Christmas presents this year.” 
After more than a decade of lobbying, industry achieved their coveted guaranteed timber 
objective. In fact, the timber supply for industry was guaranteed in twenty-five-year contracts that are 
quite favourable to industry and quite difficult for any future government to cancel. If that were to 
happen, lawsuits for damages would almost certainly ensue. The contracts stipulate that industry is 
required to make investments in their mills, but only if market conditions are favourable. In contrast, the 
government has committed the fibre to industry in a way that leaves future governments with little room 
to renegotiate the deals despite what appears to be a publically unpopular decision. 
There was a sustained outcry over the forest strategy that lasted several months. In addition to 
the usual environmental groups expressing outrage over the Crown forest giveaway, several other 
groups and individuals stepped up to express opposition to the plan and to the secretive manner in which 
it was planned and executed. A prominent member of J.D. Irving’s science advisory team spoke out 
about the plan (CBC News, 19 March 2014). Some 184 professors and instructors from of a wide variety 
of disciplines from several New Brunswick universities made a written plea to quash the deal until 
further study was undertaken (CBC News, 16 May 2014). Eighteen staff members of the Faculty of 
Forestry and Environmental Management (a significant majority) signed the letter. The academics’ 
concern was less with the content and more with the lack of consultation in the process. Two former 
ministers of the DNR, one each from the Liberals and Conservatives, spoke in opposition to the plan 
(CBC News, 5 May 2014). A survey conducted by the author in May 2014 showed that 61% of 
respondents opposed the forest strategy compared to 20% who supported it. Furthermore, 80% of 
respondents expressed a preference for taking care of conservation needs first from Crown land before 
allocating timber to industry on the remaining land. Conversely, 11% preferred allocating timber first 
and looking after conservation needs second (CBC News, 13 June 2014). A subsequent industry-
sponsored poll suggested an even split among the public regarding the forest strategy (CBC News, 4 
July 2014). 
Premier Alward pitched his campaign for the September 2014 election as a referendum on their 
aggressive development strategies for the province’s natural resources. Rather than truly use the election 
as a referendum, the Alward government was alleged to have finalized signing the forestry contracts just 
days before the writ was issued in August. The door to changing the forestry deal was closed. As a 
result, hydrological fracturing for natural gas had a more prominent role than forestry during the 
campaign. Alward and his Conservative colleagues asked voters to “Say yes” to resource development, 
but voters did not comply. The race was close, but the Liberals, led by Brian Gallant, won twenty-seven 
seats with 42.7% of the popular vote compared to the Conservative’s twenty-one seats garnered from 
34.6% of the popular vote. The candidate who was most outspoken about the need to cancel the forestry 
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deals and ban shale gas development, David Coon of the Green Party, was elected despite running 
against a high-profile incumbent who was Alward’s minister of energy and mines. 
Discussion 
Prior to the March 2014 announcement of the new forest strategy, Premier Alward said that the 
public had already been consulted on forestry. He claimed that more than a dozen reports had been done 
and that it was time for action. However, the premier did not explain how the government used or 
considered any of those reports or prior consultations in making its decision. While there has been 
considerable discussion and debate regarding forestry and Crown land since 1997, Alward’s forest 
strategy represented a radical departure from the previous management philosophy. At public hearings 
in 2003 a majority of stakeholders said they did not want their government to comply with industry’s 
wish for a guaranteed timber objective. The same message was clear in the 2007 survey. After that 
survey, successive governments led by Liberals and Conservatives stopped asking the public their 
opinion. Prior to the rollout of the forest strategy, the public was not consulted, nor was the private 
woodlot sector consulted, nor the ENGO community, nor First Nations with whom government is 
legally obliged to consult. No consultations or meaningful government-sponsored public engagement 
occurred after the announcement, either. Since 2001, industry has been dogged in its pursuit of a legally, 
contractually guaranteed fibre supply, and its modus operandi throughout the period was “If at first you 
don’t succeed, try, try again.” Eventually industry lobbying paid off. 
Democracy comes in several forms. There is the democracy inherent in elections, which has to 
do with the fairness, legality, and legitimacy of the process whereby we choose our leaders. But second, 
and less often considered, there is participatory or procedural democracy, whereby those elected leaders 
and civil servants in charge of developing policy solicit input and provide citizens venues and 
opportunities to voice their views. On the forestry file in New Brunswick over the last decade and a half, 
there appears now to have been a brief period during which the government experimented with and then 
rejected the idea of gathering meaningful public input to facilitate the development of policy. The public 
meetings concerning protected natural areas in 1998 and the public hearings on wood supply in 2003 
created an appetite for more engagement. The accountability and transparency reforms recommended by 
the all-party Legislative Select Committee on Wood Supply, and the government’s acceptance of several 
of these, seemed to usher in a period of heightened sensitivity to citizen concerns. It is important to 
understand that citizen concerns are different than stakeholder concerns. Stakeholder politics is the battle 
between vested interests. It often involves winners and losers, as some stakeholder values are 
incompatible. Citizen concerns have to do with what the majority believes is in the best interest of 
society. It is not “me”-focused; it is “us”-focused. Even though public-engagement tools generally ask 
individuals their views, we are essentially asking “What course of action is best for New Brunswick 
with respect to Crown land?” rather than “What decision would benefit you the most?” 
There was a historic opportunity in 2008 for a deep, meaningful, province-wide conversation 
about the fate of Crown land. The Liberal government of the day had released three government-
commissioned reports: one related to social preferences for Crown land management (Nadeau et al. 
2007), one related to the ecological capacities of the Crown land base (Erdle 2008), and one related to 
where New Brunswick’s resources lined up with global economic opportunities (Roberts and 
Woodbridge 2008). With all this fresh information on the table, Premier Graham passed on the 
opportunity to have an open and public dialogue about the future course of Crown land management. 
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Comments were invited following the release of the Erdle Report and the Roberts and Woodbridge 
Report, but the Graham government had done its best to suppress the data on social preferences (Nadeau 
et al. 2007). Comments were mostly solicited via the Internet, but they were collated privately and not 
reported officially. 
While the Internet does hold some promise with regard to democratic practice, it also has some 
inherent problems. Governments led by both Conservative and Liberal premiers have turned 
increasingly to online solicitation for public comment while abandoning the use of other public-
engagement tools. When a report or policy document is commissioned, citizens are invited to send a 
comment by private e-mail or to a website. If there is no public accessibility to the electronic responses, 
we have to take it on faith that the government is honestly reporting the volume of comments they 
receive. More importantly, we need to take it on faith that they have interpreted and tallied the content of 
those comments correctly (public preferences). This is not to suggest that we should govern purely by 
the public’s will—whichever policy direction receives the most letters wins. However, the public does 
have a right to know what the collective will is, and if the government chooses to go against the 
collective will, it needs to own that and explain why it has done so. The public opinion survey of 2007 
was powerful because it showed that the successive governments that endorsed industry-friendly 
policies were doing so against the will of a majority of New Brunswick citizens. The poll results 
released in June 2014 confirmed that a 61% majority of the public remains uncomfortable with a “fibre-
first” approach to Crown land management. The public hearings of 2003 forced the government of the 
day to back away from the most industry-friendly recommendations of the Jaakko Pöyry Report. What 
few seem to remember is that it was the very public nature of the wood supply hearings and passion 
expressed there that made the all-party LSCWS and later the government propose more a balanced 
policy than the ones we have seen in recent years. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the ten-year period 1997–2007, many people involved in promoting greater 
accountability in Crown land management through the judicious use of an array of citizen engagement 
and public participation tools felt that the government was not doing enough. During the same period, 
the government seemed to be experimenting, sometimes awkwardly, with the processes of public 
engagement. The communications infrastructure of government was set up to disseminate information to 
the public, not to receive it. When government representatives (elected or civil service) did collect social 
data from the public, they did not seem to know what to do with it, or how to integrate it with ecological 
or economic data. For a time, resource professionals in DNR seemed open to outside help in creating an 
enhanced two-way flow of information between the public and decision-makers. However, following the 
public opinion survey of 2007, the government’s direction for forest policy took a decidedly non-
consultative, pro-industry turn. The experiment with engaging with ordinary citizens on natural resource 
files appears to have died in 2008. 
It may be that the politics and the policy environment for natural resource management have 
changed. Recent New Brunswick governments have adopted a “governing from the centre” model, 
perhaps modelled after Stephen Harper’s style of central control of information and decisions and strict 
party discipline (Savoie 1999). It is governance by edict, not by consultative or collaborative dialogue. 
In New Brunswick in recent years, few bipartisan legislative committees have been struck. Politics has 
become more about winning, more about making your opponent look bad, and holding on to power. At 
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the same time, New Brunswick’s electorate seems unusually active and feeling its own potential power 
through well-networked mass, grassroots movements. The NB Power sale saw the rise of the first 
effective grassroots movement. Protest over shale gas exploration and development has not scored any 
decisive policy victories, though proponents of bans and a moratorium were elected in September 2014. 
It appears that the movement is not going to fade away any time soon. Shawn Graham was the first 
elected premier in New Brunswick not to be returned to office for a second term. David Alward was the 
second premier to achieve that dubious distinction, and many pundits point to both premiers’ 
unwillingness to listen to or consult voters on major natural resource issues (NB Power, shale gas) as the 
chief reason for the demise of their political fortunes. 
Will forestry be the next issue to capture the public’s attention and inspire a grassroots 
movement as it did with the NB Power sale and shale gas development? If so, it will be going head-to-
head against the most powerful economic interests in the province, and it will be doing so through social 
media, not with any assist from New Brunswick’s English-language print media. A popular online film 
series is bringing sustained attention to the issue. Environmental coalitions are forming. Scientists are 
taking bolder stances in the media, and retired foresters and retired ministers of natural resources are 
even chiming in with their displeasure. While it appears the Alward government has locked us in to 
twenty-five-year binding fibre commitments, forestry has a way of always remaining in the political 
conversation in New Brunswick. 
Thomas M. Beckley teaches in the Faculty of Forestry and Environmental Management at the 
University of New Brunswick. 
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